Abstract This paper identifies factors that encourage or reduce pick-pocketing at underground rail stations through a case study analysis of the London Underground.
Introduction
This study analyses theft of personal property offences on the London Underground (LU). This major mass transit system carries over 1,000 million passenger per year, and experienced 5,063 theft offences in financial year 2011 (BTP, 2013 . Whilst this represents a rate of only four thefts per million passenger journeys, theft is a key offence type on the LU. Indeed, as a proportion of all offences, over half were for theft. This paper examines a specific type of theft offence, what Smith (2008) termed stealth crimes, for example pick-pocketing. It excludes snatching and other theft types. For these stealth offences, victims are often unaware items are stolen, only discovering them missing at a later date, on transit journeys usually somewhere else on the transit line. As the location of many of these thefts is unknown, an innovative methodology is used to better estimate the locations of theft on transit stations. This is termed Interstitial Crime Analysis (ICA) and is described in detail by Newton et al (2014) .
This research builds on the Newton et al (2014) study into the spatial patterns of theft on the LU that found; theft was concentrated at a small number of stations; positive correlations existed between theft at three settings, 'below ground', 'at' stations; and, in 'nearby' surroundings of stations; and, that these correlations were most prominent at peak travel times. A key question that arose in the previous study which this paper attempts to address is: What are the explanations for these patterns of theft observed on the LU? This paper aims to identify predictor variables of theft on the LU at two distinct settings; within underground rail stations; and, in the nearby surroundings of stations.
The key questions are; what predictor variables influence theft on the LU; and, is there any evidence of a transmission of theft risk between these internal and external settings?
Theoretical explanations and previous studies (for overviews see Smith and Clarke, 2000; Smith and Cornish, 2006; Newton, 2014) suggest three possible inter-related explanations for theft on transit systems; the presence of transit systems are themselves a system cause of theft; stations act as generators/attractors of theft; and, stations serve as a type of 'risky facility'.
Theoretical background
The presence of transit systems may help shape the crime patterns of urban areas (Piza and Kennedy, 2003) . Stations act as a focal point, the entrances and exit to the system, and the interchanges connecting different journeys. During peak travel times they concentrate a number of persons together in small spaces, at other times stations are isolated with fewer users. The presence of a transit station may create opportunities for offending at particular locations at certain times of the day. Therefore, the first question is whether the transit system itself creates opportunities for theft, driven by passenger movement and passenger journeys.
Attractors and generators
Stations may serve as attractors or generators of crime (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1995) . Crime attractors are places offenders visit due to known expected opportunities for crime, for example liquor stores, pawn brokers, drug-treatment centres, homeless shelters, and liquor clubs (Rengert et al, 2005; McCord et al, 2007) . Generators are settings whereby a number of persons are channelled together, resulting in unplanned but favourable conditions for crime, for example high schools, football stadiums and parks (Groff and McCord 2012) . Kurland (2013) states for football stadiums (although this could equally apply to underground stations) that they may act as; mostly a crime attractor; mostly a crime generator; or simultaneously as a crime generator/crime attractor. However, attractors and generators are difficult to quantify, a point returned to later in this paper. The second question to be explored is therefore whether stations act as an attractor or generator of theft, or both?
Stations may also act as 'risky facilities', a term used to describe similar land features such as bars or hospitals, or in this case underground rail stations, whereby, most of the crime at these facilities occurs at only a minority of them (Eck et al, 2007) .
Explanations for the presence of risky facilities are centred on the mobility of urban areas, determined by the geometry and patterns of crime (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993) . Offenders and victims have daily movement patterns termed routine activities (Felson and Cohen, 1980) , and movement is concentrated at favourite activity nodes, for example based on work, leisure, or recreation activities. Risky facilities are often located at these activity nodes. Travel between nodes occurs along distinct routes (paths) constrained by obstacles (barriers) to movement, and offenders increase knowledge of suitable opportunities to offend during their routine activities. On transit systems there are may be certain nodes (stations) and paths (railway lines) that users favour. It is suggested that the presence or absence of certain features along these paths and at these nodes may encourage or deter offenders. A third question is therefore; what characteristics of stations and their nearby surroundings influence opportunities for theft?
All three theoretical standpoints propose that high crime stations will be located in high crime areas, and low crime stations in low crime areas. This suggests crime is a product of its wider environment, and Block and Block (2000) usefully term these nearby surroundings the 'environs' of rapid transit. However, the research evidence here is unclear. Not all stations in high crime areas experience high crime levels. Some studies suggest a well-designed transit station can insulate itself from crime in the wider environment (Clarke et al, 1996; La Vigne 1996) ; others argue high crime stations are situated in high crime areas (Block and Block, 2000; Loukaitou-Sideris et al, 2002; Ceccato et al, 2013 . Few studies have examined this explicitly for theft. La Vigne's (1996) study found Part I offences (including the subcategory of theft)
were not correlated with their external environment. However, theft could not be isolated here from other Part I crimes thus findings here for theft alone may be skewed by other crime types. 
Theft on transit systems
Theft on underground stations has been shown to be non-uniform in time and space, concentrated at particular stations and peak times of the day (Loukatiou-Sideris et al, 2002; Ceccato et al, 2013; Newton, 2014) . Theft concentrates at busy stations during the early morning and afternoon rush hour periods. However, high passenger numbers and nearby high theft levels alone do not provide a sufficient explanation of theft.
Additional predictor variables present both inside stations (internal characteristics) and in their nearby surroundings (external features) are required to better explain theft levels on underground transit systems, and previous literature on potential mechanisms of theft on transit systems identified a number of possible predictor variables of theft. Newton et al (2014) summarised a number of mechanisms that may act as predictor variables for theft at transit stations. For this study, these are grouped into the following classifications; high densities of people clustered together in small spaces; a lack of user knowledge about the system; the ease of passenger distraction; the accessibility and ease of access to and exit from stations; anonymity of offenders; barriers to movement between and within stations; and, staffing, protection and guardianship. These are not mutually exclusive, for example, high passenger density offers natural anonymity and reduced likelihood of detection. Moreover, individual predictor variables such as paid control gates, better lighting, or the presence of CCTV may impact on more than one of the above classifications.
Stations may act as a crime generator or attractor although few have attempted to quantify the differences between these. Perhaps a useful starting point here is offered by Clarke and Eck (2003) ; crime generators are defined as having a high count of crime but a low rate per population; and crime attractors as experiencing a high count and rate of crime, a point returned to later in this paper. This is further complicated as additional features near to a station may also be a crime attractor or generator. Whilst some studies have examined attractors and generators near to risky facilities (Groff et al, 2010) , few have examined this specifically for transit stations. Bernasco and Block (2011) investigated the influence of crime generators, crime attractors, and offender anchor points on robbery near to rail stations and found; pull factors such as crime generators increased the transient population of an area and therefore increased risk; blocks with attractors/generators of crime elevated crime risk in adjacent blocks; and, push factors such as the presence and proximity of a motivated offender's anchor point increased risk. Again, the authors did not distinguish between features that served as crime attractors and those that were crime generators. Groff and McCord (2012) examined generators around parks and found; elevated levels of crime near to parks increased risk inside parks; that both the internal and external settings of parks influenced risk; and that features serving as activity generators inside parks reduced crime. Parks with more activity generators, generally the larger parks, had more legitimate users, more capable guardians, and therefore less crime. However, not all activity generators increase legitimate users. At transit stations more activity generators may not reduce theft. Increased numbers of users may actually increase targets but also disguise offenders. Loukatiou-Sideris et al (2002) term this a second level population density; as passenger levels increase, a certain density (first level) may be reached that encourages some violent crimes; beyond this, even higher passenger densities (second level) may actually promote some lower level crimes such as pickpocketing.
Outside of parks, Groff and McCord found increased levels of mixed land use near parks reduced crime levels by increasing 'eyes on the street', consistent with the work of Jacobs (1961) . However as discussed by Browning et al (2010) mixed land use may also increase crime prevalence due to territorial impacts, reducing informal levels of social control, consistent with Newman (1973) . For this paper land use near to stations will be tested as an external predictor variable of theft, as this may serve to increase or potentially reduce theft levels.
Data and methodology
This study uses data from a range of sources, including data on theft within and near to stations, and possible predictor variables of theft, both inside stations (internal characteristics) and near to stations (the external environment). Theft data was captured for the internal setting, within stations, and the external environs near to stations. For theft at stations, the BTP theft data was separated into thefts 'at' stations with a known location, and theft that happens as part of a transit journey (with an unknown location). The latter was measured using the ICA measure to estimate likely locations of underground theft during transit journeys. A 400m buffer zone around stations was used for the external environs near to stations, a distance
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shown from previous studies to be appropriate . Additional crime data for other crime types which may influence theft levels were captured at census ward level as it was not available within the 400m buffer for this study.
Interstitial Crime Analysis (ICA)
A difficulty in analysing pick-pocketing offences is that time and location are often unknown; theft may have occurred at or between several stations traversed during a transit journey. The innovative ICA technique generates probability estimates of the likely locations of theft on underground journeys using the following procedure. passengers X, Y, and Z combined. For this paper an ICA score was calculated for each station and station segment using 5063 theft offences on the LU. An ICA score for each station was generated. This was further standardised as a rate (ICA adj*), by dividing the ICA score by the number of annual passenger journeys at each station.
Predictor Variables
A range of station features were selected as potential 'internal' predictor variables of theft including; station age and depth, gates and validators, ticket machines, lifts and escalators, amenities, staffing levels and number of platform (Table One) . An OLS regression model revealed these variables were highly correlated with each other, and therefore some variables were removed to avoid multicollinearity errors (Table 1) . A second OLS regression model confirmed those selected for further analysis were within acceptable statistical levels (VIF< 3.5, Tolerance >0.25). Table 1 A range of potential 'external' predictor variables for theft were identified from the environs of stations including; socio-demographic data, accessibility measures based on roads and paths, nearby crime levels, and local land use (Table Two) . An OLS regression model was again used to remove any highly correlated variables. As a final stage, a third OLS model combining both the internal and external predictor variables was generated, and any highly correlated variables were removed before further analysis. The variance inflation factor and tolerance scores revealed variables selected for further modelling were appropriate. Table 2 A third possible theft predictor variable of theft, in addition to the internal and external predictor variables is 'station type' and this was captured and classified using three methods. The first was based on fare zone ranging from zone 1 to zone 6; stations in zone 1 are in the centre of the LU network, those in zone 6 on the outskirts. The second was a TfL classification of primary usage and location, namely; 'City'; 'Inner Suburb'; 'Outer Suburb'; 'Shopping'; 'Terminus'; and 'Tourist'. The third method was an attractor/generator index (AGI) developed specifically for this paper.
Preliminary analysis found considerable variation when comparing stations which experienced high counts of theft, and those stations which had high rates of theft (per million passenger journeys). Only ten stations were in the top twenty of all LU stations for both theft counts and theft rates. Furthermore, there was also considerable spatial variation in high risk stations by time of the day. Therefore the AGI was developed to separate stations into possible crime attractors (with high counts and rates of theft) and potential crime generators (with high counts of theft only). These were also subdivided further by those that experienced; high rates of theft at all times of the day; high theft rates but only at certain times of the day; and, low theft rates. 
Modelling
A series of negative binomial Poisson regression models were constructed. The dependent variable was theft at stations measured using the ICA, and this was regressed against a series of potential internal and external predictor variables. Preliminary analysis of the distribution of the ICA scores based on cumulative count data revealed this was highly skewed and over dispersed. Therefore negative binomial Poisson regression models were deemed appropriate (Hilbe, 2011) as used in a number of studies (Osgood, 2000; MacDonald and Lattimer, 2010; Bernasco and Block, 2011 ).
Six models were constructed; model 1 considered internal characteristics, model 2 external features, and model 3 combined internal and external variables. Three additional models were generated (4-6) to incorporate station type into the analysis, using fare zone, TfL classification, and the AGI score.
The negative binomial Poisson models use theft counts rather than rates. The population at risk is accounted for through the use of an exposure measure, the offset variable. In this analysis, annual per million passenger journey counts at each station were used as the offset variable. Therefore passenger levels which may influence theft levels (Ceccato et al, 2013; Newton et al 2014) are included in the model but not as a direct predictor variable. The procedure for generating each model was; enter each predictor variable one at a time, significant variables are kept, and none significant variables are removed at each iteration stage. This was repeated for all predictor variables. At the end of this procedure, none significant variables are re-entered into the model to check if they influence the final model and re-included if significant.
Results and Discussion
Model 1 examined internal predictors of theft (Table 3 ) and variables found to have a statistically significant positive relationship with theft were; the number of lifts that are primary means of access to platforms; and the number of waiting rooms. Negative relationships were found for; station depth; the number of electronic gates; and, the number of platforms. In model 2 (Table 3) external variables found to positively influence theft were; the percentage of roads and paths near to stations; and high levels of theft nearby. Negative relationships were found between theft and; more domestic buildings nearby; and, high levels of violence against the person near to stations. The log likelihood, BIC and AIC values in models 1 and 2 showed they were both better predictors of theft than the baseline model 0 (stations offset by passenger numbers with no predictor variables). Table 3 Model 3 combined both internal and external predictor variables of theft into a single model (Table 3) . The log likelihood, AIC and BIC scores revealed model 3 was a better predictor of theft than models 1 and 2. There were some differences in identified Moreover, model 6 which incorporated internal characteristics, external variables, and station typology, was a better predictor of theft than other models, suggesting there is an interaction between the internal and external features that influence theft, and, therefore, it is argued that a transmission of theft risk does exist between underground stations and their nearby environs.
There are a number of potential limitations with this analysis. The ICA technique may not accurately estimate likely locations of risk as it assumes that the risk at a segment between two stations, and the risk at a station are equal. Suggestions for future refinement of the ICA method are provided by Newton et al, (2014) . The AGI index could also be further refined and tested. The predictor variables used may not include all relevant variables, and external predictors are aggregated using census wards which may not representative of station environs. Recorded crime data is subject to underreporting, although it is contended under-reporting of theft is likely to be a universal problem across the entire LU, not skewing the ICA scores by individual stations. The analysis is based on the LU network and there may be errors due to spatial autocorrelation. However, although the ICA scores are subject to a high degree of spatial auto-correlation, an examination of the ICA adj* (standardised per million passenger journeys) did not find such errors. The negative binomial Poisson regression models are offset by the passenger data thus it is not thought spatial autocorrelation errors are present.
Conclusion
This paper examined potential predictor variables of theft selected from the 'internal'
settings of stations and their nearby 'external' environs. It combined the use of the innovative ICA measure for predicting underground theft at unknown locations and times, with negative binomial Poisson regression models to identify predictor variables of theft on the LU. Factors found to increase risk of theft were those that may encourage congestion of passengers within stations (lifts and waiting rooms), and those that increased levels of accessibility and access to stations (more paths and roads nearby). In contrast those that reduce theft were those likely to decrease anonymity and increase potential guardianship and offender detection (higher levels of staffing, personal validators, shop rentals, and more domestic buildings nearby), and those that disperse passengers throughout the station and avoid congestion (more platforms). Stations with higher theft levels in their surrounding environs, those identified as crime attractors (high theft counts and high theft rates), and stations with high levels of tourist use were at greater risk. Terminus stations were at lower risk.
Policy implications and future avenues
The evidence presented in this paper suggests offenders operate both inside the LU and near to underground stations. Indeed, even if different offenders are in operation at these two settings, at peak travel times this elevated risk occurs both within and near to high risk stations, thus deployment of resources, joint operations and shared intelligence between BTP, MPS and CoLP should be encouraged. The ICA technique can assist in identifying the location and times of high risk stations, and deployment at these times and places should focus on both settings, within stations and in their nearby environs, as both are subject to elevated risk levels.
This paper presents evidence of a transmission of theft risk between the internal and external environments and vice versa, and therefore it is likely that barriers to movement between these settings (for example paid access gates) are perhaps not effective at deterring pick-pocketing offenders. An explanation offered by Newton et al, (2014) is that offenders are able to travel 'unregistered' on the LU using Oyster cards (plastic pre-paid travel cards) and all day travel cards, which can be bought with cash at automated machines. These travel cards are inexpensive for all day travel, and the price of travel may be small compared to the potential rewards of successful and undetected theft activity. 
